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Abstract / Résumé
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the period
spanning the years 1979-1991, this essay examines the impact of employer-provided
formal training on the wage profile and on the mobility of young Americans making
their transition to the labor market. By exploiting the longitudinal aspect of the data
set, we are able to provide some control for unobserved individual and job-match
heterogeneity by making use of the methodology proposed by Altonji and Shakotko
(ReStud 87). The results show that (i) training with the current employer has a
statistically and economically significant positive effect on the wage; (ii) employers
seem to reward skills acquired through training with previous employers as much as
skills they provide themselves; (iii) workers undergoing training have 18 percent lower
starting salaries than other workers; this result is obtained by setting up a starting
wage equation and by making use of a variable called "on-the-job training still in
progress at the time of the interview" ; (iv) with a hazard model which makes use of
multiple employment spells by the same worker (thereby allowing the implementation
of fixed-effects methods akin to the conditional logit method), skills acquired through
formal training programs provided by the current employer seem to be fairly specific.
The upshot from these results is that formal on-the-job-training in the current job
contains both a general component which the employer rewards up to its market value
and a specific component which reduces mobility while not being rewarded.
En utilisant des données américaines du National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), cette étude sattarde à examiner limpact de la formation dispensée par
lemployeur sur le profil salarial ainsi que sur la mobilité des jeunes travailleurs faisant
leur entrée sur le marché du travail. En exploitant laspect longitudinal de léchantillon
de façon à tenir compte de lhétérogénéité non observée, les résultats montrent (i) un
impact économiquement et statistiquement significatif de la formation sur le salaire dans
lemploi courant, (ii) un impact substantiel sur le salaire de la formation acquise avec les
employeurs précédents, (iii) une réduction denviron 18 % du salaire de départ pour les
travailleurs en formation, et (iv) par un modèle de durée qui tient compte des épisodes
multiples demploi (permettant alors lutilisation de méthodes de type * effets fixes +), un
degré substantiel de spécificité du capital humain acquis par le biais de programmes de
formation dispensés par lemployeur. La conclusion à tirer de ces résultats est que le
capital humain acquis contient à la fois une composante générale rémunérée également par
tous les employeurs ainsi quune composante spécifique qui réduit la mobilité tout en
nétant pas rémunérée.
See also Altonji and Spletzer (1991) for another example of a study which makes use of data on the1
duration of training spells. Their paper, however, focuses on the determinants of employer-provided training.
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I. Introduction
Much of the debate surrounding the issue of whether wages rise with years of
seniority has focused on the magnitude of the tenure effect and on the possible
explanations for this effect, including the theory of human capital. Only recently have
there been attempts at measuring directly the effect of accumulating human capital
through training. Mincer (1988), Brown (1989), Barron, Black and Loewenstein
(1989), Barron, Berger and Black (1993), and Levine (1993) have attempted to do so
with training data that were of a qualitative and subjective nature while Lynch (1992)
and Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) used a data set, the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY), that has the actual number of weeks spent training.1
The objective of this paper is to provide yet another look at this question using
the NLSY for the period spanning the years 1979 to 1991. The longitudinal aspect of
the larger data set is then exploited to analyze the impact of explicitly taking into
account unobserved heterogeneity on (i) the effect of various forms of training on the
wage profile, ii) the extent to which workers changing jobs benefit from having been
trained by previous employers, and (iii) the propensity to change jobs. Also, the
question of whether workers pay for their training by accepting lower starting wages
will be examined by using a variable , on-the-job training still in progress, that seems
best suited for picking up that effect, if indeed workers do pay for the training
expenses (which are shown to be incurred largely by employers).
The estimating strategy is the following: after estimating with ordinary and
generalized least squares a standard wage equation augmented with the training
variables, these variables as well as the tenure and experience variables will be
instrumented in order to alleviate correlation problems between them and the
individual and job-match fixed effects, following the procedure proposed by Altonji
and Shakotko (1987). The results show that there are substantial returns to training,
more particularly on-the-job training, whether it be with the current employer or with
subsequent employers. In fact, the results indicate that the human capital acquired
through training appears to be just as valuable (to the worker) with subsequent
employers than it is with the current employer. This apparent portability of the skills
acquired through on-the-job training suggests that we should be observing lower
starting wages for workers who are undergoing training. Indeed, the results show that
workers implicitly pay for these returns by having lower starting wages. This is shown
by estimating a starting wage equation with ordinary least squares where some control
is provided for unobserved heterogeneity. Next, a proportional hazard model is
3estimated and the results show a substantial degree of firm-specificity for human
capital acquired through training received with the current employer. This result holds
even if control is provided for unobserved person-specific heterogeneity through the
use of fixed-effect methods. Note, however, that when I control for such heterogeneity,
training received with previous employers is shown to have no significant positive
impact on mobility, contrary to the case in which there is no control for heterogeneity.
These results point toward the following conclusion: for this sample of young
workers, employers react to market pressures by setting wages at the market level with
no premium paid for the firm-specific productivity of the trained workers. To be more
precise, the results from the wage equation and those from the hazard model indicate
that formal on-the-job training in the current job contains at once a general component
which the employer rewards up to its market value and a firm-specific component
which reduces mobility but which does not appear to be rewarded. Thus, there is little
evidence that these workers are paid much in excess of their outside option.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the
theoretical models underpinning the estimation. Section III provides a thorough
description of the data set and of the various definitions of the training variables used
in the estimation procedures. Particular attention is paid to the timing of training over
the course of an employment relationship and on who pays the direct costs of training,
observation that will help in the interpretation of the results. Section IV presents the
estimating framework as well as a discussion of the results. Section V concludes the
paper.
II. Theoretical Framework
According to the theory of general human capital as formulated in Becker
(1975), workers who invest in general on-the-job training should pay the full costs and
reap the full return from their investment. If firms pay the direct costs of general
training, then workers should be expected to reimburse the firm by accepting a lower
starting wage. In other words, during the training period, workers are paid below their
value on the market. When training is completed, their value to the firm as well as
their market value increase and competitive forces insure that they are paid at their
market value. An immediate implication is that wages should rise with experience in
the labor market since productivity increases with time in the labor market for those
who get general training. Moreover, the theory predicts that investment in on-the-job
training should decline as the workers age for basically two reasons: 1) the period over
which the rewards will accrue to the workers gets shorter and 2) the opportunity cost
of training increases as the wage increases over time. On the other hand, if workers
4invest in entirely firm-specific on-the-job training, the theory suggests that the firm and
the workers should share in the returns and the costs. The motivation for sharing the
investment stems from the uncertainty surrounding the parties post-investment
behavior. For instance, were the workers paying the full costs of the investment, they
would face the possibility of an employer-initiated separation in the period following
the investment. They would therefore be incurring a capital loss since, by definition,
the value of marginal product outside the firm is the same whether training has
occurred or not. As for the firm, if it were to bear the full costs of training, the
possibility that the workers would leave while the firm was in the process of
harvesting the return on its investment would imply a capital loss for the latter.
Consequently, both parties share the costs and the returns on the investment. The
empirical implications are that 1) wages should be rising with seniority because
productivity increases with seniority and 2) turnover should decrease when there is
investment in firm-specific human capital.
Hashimoto (1981) subsequently provided a formalization of Beckers sharing
hypothesis. He showed that sharing arises in response to transaction costs, not because
of uncertainty concerning the behavior of parties in the post-investment years. More
precisely, since it is costly for both parties to evaluate and agree on the workers
productivity in the firm and outside the firm in the years following the investment,
there will be situations where the worker may quit or the firm may dismiss the worker
even if separation entails a net loss. Therefore, parties will determine the optimum
sharing ratio prior to undertaking the investment, thus minimizing the loss from non-
optimal separations. Hashimoto shows that if there were no transaction costs, the
sharing ratio would be irrelevant to the separation decisions. Although the main reason
for sharing is different than in Beckers original argument, the empirical implication
for the wage profile is the same, namely that wages should rise with seniority.
An even more efficient contract was derived by Carmichael (1983). Like
Hashimoto, he assumed that after an initial period of training, information is revealed
asymmetrically: only the firm knows the value of marginal product while only the
worker knows his degree of job satisfaction. Since information cannot be exchanged
ex post due to transaction costs, both parties make their separation decision
independently. The worker leaves if his job satisfaction is below a certain threshold
while the firm fires the worker if his revealed productivity is below a critical level.
Carmichael argues that welfare can be improved by making both parties internalize
the entire expected losses from a separation, regardless of who initiates it, instead of
merely internalizing their share of the return, as in Hashimotos contract. To achieve
such a constrained optimum, Carmichael modified Hashimotos structure by
introducing seniority-based promotions. Suppose that there are two jobs in the second
period, type 1 jobs and type 2 jobs. The productivity of the workers is identical in the
5two types of jobs. After separation decisions are made at the start of the second period,
all workers still with the firm enter type 1 jobs where they are paid w . Later in period,2
some of these workers are promoted to type 2 jobs on the basis of their seniority where
they are paid w + B where B is a bonus which is determined ex ante when the parties2
agree on the contract. By assumption, there is a fixed number of type 2 jobs, therefore
a layoff can only save the firm w since a junior worker will immediately fill the vacant2
position. Thus, the incentive for the firm to fire any high wage worker is reduced. In
effect, junior workers are acting as a third party by benefitting from any separation
since the layoff of a senior worker increases their own seniority, thus improving their
chance of eventually getting a type 2 job. Having determined the second period wage
schedule, the first period wage is adjusted so that the expected value of the contract
equals that available to the worker in the market. Carmichael shows that this system
of promotions based on seniority makes the separation decisions more efficient. Two
implications of Carmichaels model are worth emphasizing. The first one is that the
more senior workers will typically be earning more than their value of marginal
product to the firm. Thus the theory of specific human capital can respond to the
challenges posed by Lazear (1979) concerning mandatory retirement and by Medoff
and Abraham (1980) who provided evidence that wages might rise with seniority even
if productivity did not. Secondly, his optimal contract implies that workers pay the full
cost of the investment in the form of lower starting wages. It should be noted
Carmichael implicitly assumes that the firm can commit to the wage schedule derived
ex ante. This is an important assumption because it assures that the firm will not
change the number of type 2 jobs available, even though it would be profitable to do
so once a junior worker is due for a promotion.
By explicitly taking into account the possibility of contract renegotiation,
Macleod and Malcomson (1993a,b) show that firms making specific investments need
not offer above market clearing wages to their workers. Since it is impossible or too
costly to write a complete contract ex ante that would prevent renegotiation, there will
be situations in which the parties renegotiate an incomplete contract. This happens if
and only if one party prefers to break the contract though it is still efficient for the
parties to continue their match. In this case, one party is prepared to give up some of
its gains in order to induce the other party not to breach. To be more precise, a firm
and a worker have formed a match in period one and the firm has made a specific
investment that affects second-period payoffs, and the worker invests only in general
skills. Random shocks to the productivity of the worker and to his outside market wage
become known to both parties at the end of the first period. If the draw the worker
receives makes the outside option preferable to the negotiated wage at the beginning
of the relation, assuming that it is efficient to continue the match, the firm renegotiates
the workers wage to the level of the outside option. Similarly, if the firm prefers to
fire the worker rather than pay her the contract wage, the worker is prepared to take
The response rate was at 71% in 1991.2
Actually, three spells from 1979 to 1986 and four spells from 1988 to 1991. The fact that no questions3
concerning training were asked in the 1987 interview does not pose any particular problems (except possibly
accuracy of recall) because the starting and ending dates given in 1988 allow for the appropriate
assignments with respect to the 1987 and 1988 interview dates.
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a pay cut in order to avoid a separation. Naturally, there are situations where no
renegotiation occurs after the realization of the random shocks. In that case, both
parties prefer to trade at the contract wage that involves some sharing of the return on
the firms investment. When only the firm invests in the worker, a contract which
avoids the holdup problem (see Williamson et al. (1975)), is one in which the
worker receives her market alternative each period, and hence wages do not rise with
tenure. When both parties make relation-specific investments, Macleod and
Malcomson show that if the worker accepts the terms of the efficient contract, then the
measured effect of tenure on wages is positive.
III. The Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data set surveyed 12,686 young
males and females who were between the age of 14 and 21 in 1979 . It contains2
detailed employment histories of the respondents thereby permitting the construction
of relatively error-free variables for tenure as well as for the total experience
accumulated since the beginning of ones full time transition to the labor market. Of
particular interest is the existence of a detailed account of the training histories of the
respondents, with the starting and ending dates of up to four spells of training lasting3
at least four weeks since the last interview. While the data give a good account of the
formal aspect of skill acquisition it is missing out on the informal aspect and, possibly,
on formal programs of short duration. The training spells are broken down into up to
12 categories (the actual number varies from year to year, although it stays at twelve
from 1988 onward) which were then classified in three groups in the same fashion as
Lynch (1992). Categories 8 and 9 ( company-provided training and seminars or
training programs at work but not run by employer) were classified as on-the-job
training, category 3 represents apprenticeship programs and categories 1 (business
colleges), 2 (nurses programs), 4 (vocational-technical institutes), 5 (barber and
beauty), 6 (flight school), 7 (correspondence courses), 10 (seminars or training
programs outside of work), 11 (vocational rehabilitation center) and 12 (other) were
classified as off-the-job training. It is also known whether the programs were
completed, not completed or still in progress at the time of the interview. Since these
workers can be followed as they move from employer to employer, it is then
straightforward to calculate the accumulated weeks of training with all previous
Note that all training undergone by the individuals while they were not employed has been excluded from4
the calculations.
We also limit the sample to workers who are at least 18 years of age.5
The choice of six years as a cutoff point is arbitrary, and hence debatable. The idea is to exclude those that6
make quasi-permanent transitions and who might be considering returning to school a few years down
the road. It seems reasonable to assume that few people would enter the labor market while planning to
leave it in six years or more to go back to school. The same could not be said if we were considering a one
to three year (say) horizon. In any event, the results were left unchanged if all school returners were
excluded.
Note that people were allowed to work less than 20 hours per week only if they were undergoing training.7
Also, to avoid left-censoring, individuals who had started working prior to January 1, 1978 were eliminated.
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employers by each type of training. I also know the identity of the party who incurred4
the direct costs of the training programs for the years 1988-1991. Even though this
information is not available for the whole period considered, the four years for which
it is available provide strong evidence that employers are paying for OJT.
Lynch (1992) could only rely on a 1983 cross-section of the data set to get most
of her results while Blanchflower and Lynch (1994) followed 1979,1980 and 1981
subsamples of 18-year-olds until they were 25 years old. Here the major restriction
that I impose is in terms of entering the labor market on a full-time basis. The people5
who were considered as meeting that criterion were (i) those whose primary activity
was either working full-time, on a temporary lay-off or looking actively for a job, (ii)
those who did not return to school on a full-time basis within six years and (iii) those6
who had worked at least half the year since the last interview and who were working
at least 20 hours per week. Individuals excluded from the sample are those younger
than 18, those that had been in the military at any time, the self-employed, the ones
whose jobs were part of a government program and the ones working without pay,
those who were in the farming business and also all public sector employees. Another
restriction was to exclude those that occupied two jobs (or more) on a full-time basis
because it is impossible to determine with which of these employers the training is
taking place, thereby possibly falsifying the results. For the earnings equation, I am
then left with 29,020 observations while the starting wage model has 13,394
observations. For the hazard model, only those that had at least two completed spells
of employment were retained to allow the implementation of a fixed-effect estimation
methodology, which leaves me with 8,097 spell-workers.7
Some summary statistics of the sample are provided in table 1 while table 2
gives us a breakdown of the number of employees who were trained by types of
training and by industrial aggregates.
Note that not all workers undergoing their first program are represented here; I have set the cutoff point8
at 28 months.
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Next, table 3 shows some summary statistics comparing those that have
received training (and who have completed their programs) with those that have not.
To be more precise, the sample is restricted to workers who had positive values for
the training variables at any moment in the employment relationship. For example,
workers those that had no training in the first two years, but who received training
thereafter are included in the sample. This way of calculating the means avoids any
upward bias that would have resulted had these people been excluded. Beside the
wage differentials, it is very interesting to note that the trained workers have enjoyed
longer careers with their respective employers compared to those that have never been
trained. Also, it is worth noting that the additional experience that the trained workers
have is usually accounted for by the additional tenure. Therefore, taking these
numbers at face value, it would seem that all types of training are of a fairly specific
nature.
If all training costs are paid by the employers and the skill enhancement
programs are, at least to some degree, portable, then you would expect the workers to
bear some portion of the costs by receiving lower starting wages. As is shown in table
4, it appears that employers are bearing much of the costs of all types of training
programs, especially the programs corresponding to on-the-job training where
between 1988 and 1991, 96.5% of the direct costs were paid by the employers.
Although that information is not available for the whole length of the panel, it seems
very unlikely that a dramatic shift would be observed in the event that it was.
Interestingly, even the categories of training programs which are labelled as off-the-
job were paid for in large part by the employers, suggesting that many of these
programs were considered as relevant to the job, thereby straining a little bit the
usefulness of distinguishing between on-the-job and off-the-job programs.
The issue of job relevance of the training programs can also be examined by
looking at the timing of the programs i.e. how soon after starting working with their
current employer do workers begin their training. One expects that the sooner the
worker receives training after being hired, the more relevant to the current job is the
program. A firm making specific investments maximizes its profits by pocketing the
returns from these investments as soon as possible. Figures 1 to 4 allow us to see the
extent to which training starts early in the employment relationship. In figure 1, the
number of months elapsed since the beginning of the job has been plotted against the
number of workers undergoing their first (and only the first) on-the-job program with
their new employer . It is clear from this graph that much of the training occurs very8
early in the relationship. The same can be said for off-the-job and apprenticeship
For the first year of tenure, it is also the case that by the six-month mark, workers have on average over9
12 weeks of completed OJT training.
See Chamberlain (82) for a discussion of nuisance parameters in panel data.10
9
(1)
programs although to a lesser extent regarding OFT (see figures 2 and 3). This pattern
of early training is important for estimation purposes since most if not all studies that
have used training data of a qualitative and subjective nature have been unable to find
convincing evidence of workers paying for their training through lower starting wages.
As Levine (1993) recognizes, it may be that such data are too coarse to pick up that
effect if it is there. In the next section, I find evidence for this hypothesis by focusing
on training that is still going on at the moment of the interview.
The tenure-training (OJT) profile is illustrated in figure 4. To construct the
training profile, the sample is restricted to workers who had (OJT) training with their
current employer. The average number of weeks of completed training for these
workers by tenure intervals of one year are then computed . As the theory of human9
capital predicts (e.g. Ben-Porath (1967)), all investment is heavily frontloaded. The
profile fluctuations following the first year reflect the turnover of workers in the
sample.
IV. Results
IV.1 Earnings Equation Estimates
Consider the following log wage equation augmented with training variables:
where w represents the real hourly wage of person i in job j at time t, T is tenure, Expijt
is total labor market experience, TCJ is training in current job, and TPJ is training in
previous jobs. All other covariates, including higher order terms for experience and
tenure, are ignored for ease of presentation. The unobserved heterogeneity components
can be decomposed into an individual effect ( " ) and a job-match effect ( 2 ). Thei ij
10
person-specific effect can be seen as representing unmeasured aspects of each
individuals earning ability while the job-match component represents the unknown
(to the econometrician) quality of the employment relationship stemming from search
activity, for example. Both of these effects are assumed to be time-invariant. It is
important to reiterate that the training variables available in the NLSY reflect the
formal aspect of the process by which workers accumulate human capital, in that only
All results are calculated using the weighted sample.11
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(2)
(3)
training programs which last at least one month are accounted for. No doubt that we
miss out on the informal aspect of the training as well as on the formal aspect for short
(i.e. less than one month) programs.
The training covariates for each category of programs (on-the-job, off-the-job
and apprenticeship) are partitioned into two parts: training received with the current
employer and all training received with previous employers, and all these variables
have been converted from weeks to years (and fractions thereof). Column (1) of table
5 shows the results obtained by using OLS. As can be seen, all three types of training11
are rewarded by the current employer with completed OJT (OJTCC) being rewarded
the most. It also appears that human capital accumulated through formal training
programs with previous employers is quite portable from firm to firm. However, the
same sort of individual and job-match heterogeneity biases which affect the
coefficients on tenure and experience are likely to be present regarding the training
variables. More able individuals (those with high "s) may have enjoyed careers that
were interrupted less frequently by unemployment spells and they may have received
more training, both with the current employer and with previous employers, while
better matches (high 2s) are likely to be formed if you have more experience and
more training (due to human capital effects and search effects). Also, tenure and
training with the current employer are possibly correlated with the job-match
component. Dropping for the moment the assumption of a time-invariant job-match
component, lets suppose that it can be written as
whereT is assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors. The other training variablesijt
are not shown for ease of presentation but the same analysis applies to them. The
discussion above suggests that R and R are positive. In the context of maximizing2 4
behavior on the part of a worker who faces a wage distribution, Topel(1991) argues
that R is negative once we control for experience, assuming there is a tenure effect.1
If there is no tenure effect, then R equals zero. Regarding R , given that we control1 3
for both experience and tenure, it seems reasonable to argue that the job-match
component of wages is non-negatively correlated with on-the-job skill acquisition.
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) we get
See also Finnie (1993) for an extension of the method of Altonji and Shakotko to the experience variable.12
In fact, a simple F-test on the equality of the coefficients associated with OJTCC and OJTCP could not13
reject the hypothesis that the two are indeed equal.
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We see from equation (3) that although we are interested in the $s, using ordinary
least-squares will produce estimates of composite effects and the regressors would still
be correlated with". To provide some correction for these problems, the instrumental
variable (IV) methodology of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) is used and is extended to
the training variables . All variables pertaining to training with the current employer,12
as well as tenure, are instrumented with their deviations from job-match means,
whereas experience and training with previous employers are instrumented with their
deviations from individual means. The instruments for training with the current
employer and tenure are, by construction, uncorrelated with the job-match component
while the instruments for training with previous employers and experience are, also
by construction, uncorrelated with individual component. This methodology is
preferred to first-differencing on the ground that differencing has greater potential to
further enhance any measurement errors present in the data as compared with using
deviations from means.
Another estimation problem pertains to the fact that residuals are likely to be
serially correlated given that the same individuals are followed over time.
Consequently, to provide correction for this problem, equation (1) is reestimated with
generalized least-squares (under the assumption of a fixed individual effect along with
an i.i.d. term), both with and without the IV methodology proposed. The results are
reported in columns (2) and (3) of table 5.
Focusing on on-the-job training first, we can see that most of the results are
qualitatively the same as with OLS, except that the coefficients are smaller both with
GLS and IV-GLS. Therefore, the returns estimated with OLS cannot be attributed
solely to job-match or individual heterogeneity. Curiously, for off-the-job training
programs, GLS and IV-GLS estimates are much larger than with OLS. Thus, it seems
that correcting for heterogeneity has the effect of removing the downward bias that
poorly matched or low-ability workers cause to the estimated coeeficients. This
contrasts with the results on apprenticeship programs where the results suggest that
well matched and high-ability individuals are selected into the programs. Given the
few workers who undertake apprenticeship (63), a word of caution seems warranted
here regarding the results pertaining to this type of training. The basic conclusion that
is to be drawn from these results is the portability of formal on-the-job and off-the-job
training programs. It appears that all completed programs of OJT and OFT are fairly13
general. Also, since the OJTCC (OFTCC) and OJTCP (OFTCP) coefficients are not
significantly different, we are led to conclude from these results that current employers
See Kiefer (1988) for a survey of hazard models or Lancaster (1990) for a detailed textbook exposition.14
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(4)
(5)
set the wage of their trained workers at pretty much the market level following
completion of the programs. Already the summary statistics in table 3 provided a clue
that employers reacted to market pressures. There we saw that workers who had
received OJT stayed with their employers a full year and a half longer on average. This
fact and the fact that OJT seems to be, at least to some degree, general (thereby
increasing outside job opportunities) is not really contradictory; rather, it just means
that employers manage to keep their trained workers by paying them their worth on
the outside market.
IV.2 Specification of the Hazard Model
To gain a better perspective on the degree of firm-specificity of the human
capital acquired with the current employer through formal training, a proportional
hazard model is estimated by using Coxs partial likelihood approach. The advantage14
of this approach is that it avoids the need to specify a baseline hazard function
(actually, all common factors, including the baseline hazard, cancel from the partial
likelihood). Another advantage of Coxs methodology is that it is possible to eliminate
all individual-specific factors, including individual-specific baseline hazards, provided
that multiple spells of employment are available for each worker. To be more specific,
lets suppose that for worker i we have n spells (ordered by their increasing length)i
and that the duration for each spell is denoted t , where j stands for the spell number.ij
Assuming all spells for the same person are independently distributed given her
heterogeneity parameter, I can write the hazard functions as:
Then, it can be shown that the partial log-likelihood function is equal to:
where the denominator corresponds to the risk set of worker i. Note that both " andi
8 do not appear in equation (5). I should point out that a rigorously specified hazardi0
model dealing with time-varying covariates such as the training variables ought to
condition on the complete time-paths (past and future) of the covariates, especially if
Note that the effect of failing to control for heterogeneity is to bias the coefficients downward in a partial15
likelihood framework (see Lancaster (1990)). Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the increase in
the coefficient associated with OJTCC is due solely to the fact that I control for the presence of low-ability
individuals.
See Topel and Ward (1992) on that subject.16
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these covariates are considered endogenous to the leaving process. This issue is a
difficult one to treat and I approximate the paths by using the current values (as of t)
for these variables.
The results are presented in table 6. The effect of correcting for unobserved
individual heterogeneity, while changing the magnitude of the coefficients (they are
actually larger in absolute value), does not alter the basic conclusion that on-the-job
training with the current employer seems to have a sizeable impact on the conditional
probability of leaving. Consequently, it can inferred from these results that the skills15
accumulated are fairly firm-specific. On the other hand, it seems that skills acquired
with previous employers are not a significant factor of increased mobility once control
is provided for unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, we should not be so
surprised at such a result. It is a well known empirical fact that mobility tends to
decrease with experience, presumably because workers, as time goes by, are able to
find increasingly better matches. Yet, labor market experience serves as a proxy for16
general human capital in a standard earnings equation. Given that skills accumulated
with previous employers, as measured by the number of weeks spent training, are
positively correlated with experience, then it is likely that this variable is correlated
with the quality of the match in much the same way as experience is. Therefore, even
if the coefficient associated with previous training were to be negative and significant,
it cannot be concluded that skills acquired through previous training are specific to the
current firm. By focusing on the probability of exiting from the first job, thereby
circumventing to a degree the problem created by the positive correlation between
match quality and experience, Lynch (1991) finds evidence of a positive impact of
prior off-the-job training on mobility. Thus, she concludes the skills acquired acquired
through this type of training is fairly general.
The results in table 6 coupled with those in column (2) of table 5 indicate that
formal on-the-job training in the current job contains at once a general component
which the employer rewards up to its market value and a specific component which
reduces worker mobility. It is then plausible to suggest that firms tend to keep their
trained workers longer as compared with other workers because they are more
productive.
To quoteMincer (1962) p.53: A direct computation of foregone earnings of workers engaged in on-the-17
job training would be possible if data were available on their earnings during and after the period of training,
and on earnings of a comparison group of workers who have the same amount of formal schooling and are
otherwise similar to the trainees, but do not receive any on-the-job training. Presumably, the latter would
have a flatter age-earnings profile than the former.
Uncompleted OJT never came out as significant in any of the regressions although it did show up as18
negative whether it was instrumented or not. Perhaps this reflects some sluggishness on the part of the wage
as it may not be reset immediately after quitting training. Another possible explanation is that employers
revise (downward) their expectation regarding the productivity of the workers. In any event, these problems
do not occur if we use ongoing training at the time of the interview.
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IV.3 The Impact of Training on the Starting Wage
The NLSY does not contain any information concerning the costs of these
training programs and hence we cannot determine if the workers pay the totality of the
costs in the form of lower starting wages. However, given that the trained workers
seem to be paid at a level approaching their market-wide marginal product and given
that from table 4, it is known that between 1988 and 1991 employers paid over 95%
of the direct costs of OJT programs, we should be finding that the workers indirectly
pay for part of these programs in the form of lower starting wages.
The way to capture that effect is by setting up a starting wage equation and by
using a variable indicating that training is still going on. OJT which has not been
completed (workers quit on the programs or the program was not completed for other
reasons) will not do for the following reason. Assuming that workers should be paying
for their training by having lower wages at the start, the results above show that
market pressure forces employers to pay their trained workers at their marginal
product following completion of OJT. Then, there is no reason to believe that things17
are much different for workers who quit on a program. More precisely, their wage
should be reset at the value of marginal product just like it would have been had they
not undertaken any training program . If I use instead the number of weeks of OJT18
training undertaken by the worker and still going on at the time of the interview, there
lies the best hope of capturing any effect. There remains the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity. Authors (e.g. Barron, Black, Loewenstein (1989)) have generally
acknowledged that the effect of job-match or individual heterogeneity biases will be
to underestimate the impact on the starting wage, even possibly masking it totally, the
reason is that more able persons may receive more training and may be paid more
even if they are undergoing training as compared with workers who are not being
Actually, this hypothesis goes back to Mincer (1962). On page 51 (footnote 4) he writes ...Greater19
learning from experience is characteristic of workers with greater motivation and ability, and their earnings
at the early stages of the career may in some cases be as high or higher than those of other workers. But such
finding that people with greater ability have higher productivity than others at any given stage of experience
does not negate the existence of investment in on-the-job training, though it may bias the estimation of its
magnitude.
See Abraham and Farber (1987) for another application of a similar control.20
Given that much of the training takes place very early in the employment relationship (see fig. 1), we21
should not be surprised to find so few respondents still in training at the time of the interview.
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trained. Therefore, any result found should probably be seen as a lower bound on the19
true result. However, some control is provided for unobserved heterogeneity with a
variable indicating the maximum amount of training that person will have received by
the end of her relationship with the employer. If it is true that higher ability20
individuals are likely to be paid more and to receive more training, then that variable
should be picking up some of that effect. Just to make clear the methodology employed
here, I used only the first wage observations on each jobs and then used OLS. Results
are reported in table 7. Even though only 134 observations had a positive value for
OJT still going on (OJTOC) , the effect is relatively large and significant: workers do21
seem to pay for their OJT through lower starting wages. The same cannot be said for
OFT and APP but this is not really that surprising given that over 25% of OFT
programs undertaken between 1988 and 1991 were not payed by the employer (35%
for apprenticeship) thereby introducing more noise in the model. Also, when the
control for unobserved heterogeneity is added to the equation, the effect is larger by
about one percent.
To summarize the results I have obtained, it seems that OJT and OFT with the
current employer is neither entirely general (otherwise there would be no reason for
it to reduce mobility) nor is it entirely specific (since then, having been trained by
previous employers should have no impact on the current wage), but is rather a blend
of these two extremes. Also, there is no evidence that employers pay their trained
workers above their market-wide marginal product. Finally, workers appear to
implicitly pay for the degree of portability of their newly acquired skills by having
lower starting wages.
V. Conclusion
The idea that general skills accumulated through training should be paid for by
the employee is a central prediction of the theory of human capital. However, all
efforts directed at verifying that prediction have been practically fruitless, so much so
16
that some researchers (e.g. Barron, Berger and Black (1993)) have started interpreting
the lack of evidence of workers paying for their training through lower starting wages
as possible evidence of dual labor markets. While the latter might indeed exist, this
paper has provided direct evidence that workers do in fact have lower starting wages
while they are going through training. Also, it has been shown that firms respond to
market pressures by setting the wage for trained workers at the market level even if,
as the hazard model results show, a sizeable portion of the investment in on-the-job
training is specific. Therefore, the evidence concerning training is not consistent with
the firm and the worker sharing the rent on the specific part of the investment. I should
mention again that these results hold for formal training programs which naturally
represent only a portion of the process by which workers accumulate skills on their
current job. It could be that the informal process of skill acquisition makes the workers
more indispensable to the firm which could then ill-afford to lose them and would
consequently, perhaps, be willing to share the rent over the return on the specific
capital embodied in these workers.
17
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TABLE 1
MEAN SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (Weighted)-NLSY
Real Hourly Wage ($1979) 5.75
Hours Worked 41.7
Tenure 2.44
Experience 5.82
Years in School 12.44
Number of Workers with On-the-Job Training 890
Number of Weeks Trained (OJT-Completed)* 13.68
Number of Workers with Off-the-Job Training 721
Number of Weeks Trained (OFT-Completed)* 15.85
Number of Workers with Apprenticeship Training 63
Number of Weeks Trained (APP-Completed)* 31.89
Percentage Nonwhite 12.6
Percentage Married 44.7
Percentage Female 45.4
Age 25.1
Number of Observations 29,020
Number of Individuals 5,649
Number of Jobs 13,590
Note-*Conditional on having positive value for these variables.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF JOB-WORKER OBSERVATIONS
WITH TRAINING BY INDUSTRIAL AGGREGATES
INDUSTRIES ON-THE-JOB OFF-THE-JOB APPRENTICESHIP
Fisheries (282) 7 21 0
Mining (398) 24 16 0
Construction (2,129) 43 77 115
Manufacturing (7,838) 590 494 94
Transportation,
Communication and Public
Utilities (1,890)
354 163 19
Wholesale and Retail Trade
(7,233)
474 482 42
Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate (2,282)
382 226 8
Business and Repair Services
(1,969)
160 143 24
Personal Services (956) 56 67 5
Entertainment and Recreation
Indus. (317)
20 19 1
Professional and Related
Services (3,726)
425 492 11
Note-Number of observations indicated in parentheses.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS-TRAINING (COMPLETED) VS NO TRAINING
OJT No OJT OFT No OFT APP No APP
Real Wage ($1979) 7.52 5.47 6.92 5.61 8.63 5.71
Hours Worked 42.23 41.57 41.68 41.65 42.65 41.64
Tenure 3.62 2.25 3.58 2.29 4.58 2.41
Experience 7.07 5.63 6.71 5.71 7.18 5.80
Training Weeks 13.68 0 15.85 0 31.89 0
Note-All statistics are weighted.
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TABLE 4
TRAINING PROGRAMS UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN 1988 AND 1991
ON-THE-JOB OFF-THE-JOB APPRENTICESHIP
Programs Undertaken 1159 734 54
Number of Programs
Payed by Employers 1119 532 35
Percentage Paid
By Employers 96.5 72.5 65
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TABLE 5
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS ESTIMATES: THE IMPACT OF TRAINING
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Wages ($1979))
Independent Variable (1)
(OLS)
(2)
(GLS)
(3)
(IV-GSL)
Tenure 0.0508 0.043 0.0210
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0042)
Tenure Squared -0.003 -0.003 -0.0019
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Total Experience 0.0532 0.0768 0.0945
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0049)
Total Experience
Squared -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0025
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
OJTCC 0.1692 0.1666 0.1216
(0.0255) (0.0274) (0.0372)
OJTCP 0.1984 0.2049 0.1319
(0.0278) (0.0355) (0.0439)
OFTCC 0.0750 0.0931 0.1420
(0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0300)
OFTCP 0.0089 0.0820 0.1260
(0.0173) (0.0247) (0.0335)
APPCC 0.0637 0.0414 0.0187
(0.0242) (0.0253) (0.0316)
APPCP 0.2146 0.1464 0.0733
(0.0224) (0.0308) (0.0380)
Indust. Dummies YES YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.3431 0.8014 0.7949
F-TEST:
OJTCC Coef.=OJTCP Coef. 0.59 0.84 0.04
p-value 0.44 0.36 0.84
Notes-Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 29,020. Other covariates not shown
in table include race, gender, marital status, union membership, SMSA, urban/rural, health,
an intercept, unemployment rate in corresponding region, number of jobs ever held by
respondent, four region and three education dummies. Aggregate effects are controlled for
by having a dummy variable for each year. OJTCC: on-the-job training completed with
current employer. OJTCP: on-the-job training completed with previous employers. The
same definitions apply to off-the-job (OFT) and apprenticeship (APP) programs.
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TABLE 6
HAZARD MODEL RESULTS
(Cox Partial Likelihood Approach)
Independent Variable (1)
No Control for
Heterogeneity
(2)
With Control for
Heterogeneity
Experience (0-1) 0.3082 0.3576
(0.0638) (0.1030)
Experience (1-2) -0.1592 -0.1958
(0.1809) (0.2898)
Experience (2-3) -0.1858 -0.1048
(0.1799) (0.2885)
Experience ( >3 ) -0.7406 -0.2882
(0.1819) (0.2955)
OJTCC -1.3516 -2.9917
(0.2350) (0.5236)
OJTCP 0.2599 -0.1513
(0.1257) (0.3741)
OFTCC -1.5107 -2.4151
(0.2056) (0.4172)
OFTCP 0.4439 0.3932
(0.1068) (0.2971)
APPCC -0.2926 -0.0781
(0.2274) (0.3863)
APPCP 0.0258 0.2231
(0.1660) (0.3205)
Number of Previous jobs 0.1186 0.2058
(0.0033) (0.0128)
Indust. Dummies YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES
Log Likelihood -54,738.01 -4,717.03
Notes-Sample size: 8,097 spells of which 1,019 are censored. Standard errors in parentheses. Unshown
covariates are the same as those in table 5.
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TABLE 7
OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF
ONGOING TRAINING ON STARTING WAGES
(Dependent Variable: log of Real Hourly Wages ($1979)
Independent Variable (1)
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
(2)
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)
Tenure 0.0438 0.0440
(0.0047) (0.0047)
Total
Experience
0.0255 0.0257
(0.0151) -0.0015
(OC) -0.1699 -0.1811
(0.0594) (0.0595)
Maximum OJT - 0.1413
During Relationship (0.0467)
OJTCC 0.3013 0.1454
(0.0774) (0.0928)
OJTCP 0.2261 0.2274
(0.0351) (0.0351)
OFTOC -0.0641 -0.0622
(0.0495) (0.0495)
OFTCC 0.0201 0.0232
(0.0725) (0.0724)
OFTCP 0.0845 0.0833
(0.0268) (0.0268)
APPOC 0.0797 0.0769
(.0609) (0.0608)
APPCC 0.0293 0.0308
(0.1489) (0.1489)
APPCP 0.0051 0.0051
(-0.0008) (-0.0008)
Indust. Dummies YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES
R-Squared 0.264 0.2645
Notes-Sample size is 13,394. Unshown covariates are the same as those in table 5. OJTOC: Number
of weeks of ongoing OJT with the current employer. The same definition applies to OFT and APP.
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Figure 1. Timing of First Training Program (OJT)
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Figure 2. Timing of First Training Program (OFT)
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Figure 3. Timing of First Training Program (APP)
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Figure 4. Tenure-Training Relationship (OJT)
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